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ABSTRACT
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran, is a unique
military institution created to secure the ideals of Iran’s revolution as well its territory. Since the
end of the Iran-Iraq War, however, the IRGC’s role in Iran’s political economy has increased
significantly beyond that mandate. Unfortunately, the leadership in the United States has
demonstrated neither the aptitude nor the desire to understand Iran. Given the IRGC’s command
of Iran’s nuclear development program and encroachment into its foreign policy, it is more
important than ever to understand Iran’s leadership structure. This study attempts to explain an
important part of that structure by considering the influence of the leadership dynamics of Iran
along with its economic and religious/social conditions on the IRGC’s position within the state,
using an historical analysis consisting of secondary sources. Accordingly, the IRGC’s rise to
power can be traced back to the dual sovereignty written into the constitution of the Islamic
Republic. Though the divine sovereignty, embodied by the velayat-e faqih (Supreme Leader), is
supposed to take precedence over popular sovereignty, embodied by the directly elected
President, when the two conflict, Khomeini’s successor, Khamenei, a junior cleric, was unable to
manage then President Hashemi Rafsanjani. So he empowered the IRGC to compensate, but that
choice set into motion a sequence of events that has enabled it to become powerful enough to be
a threat to the velayat-e faqih himself.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Thesis
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran (Guard), is
one of the most unique military organizations. Created by the decree of the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini in early May of 1979, its original purpose was to guard the Islamic Revolution against
supporters of the just deposed Shah and rival revolutionary groups, as its name suggests. 1
However, over time the IRGC’s actual role and influence grew significantly beyond that of its
initial mandate. What accounts for that change and its present characteristics is the object of this
study.
Hypothesis
Though the IRGC’s origins lie in the Islamic Revolution, it was in the aftermath of the
Iran-Iraq War that two important changes were enacted to put them on the path to prominence.
The first concerned the power structure of the Islamic Republic. As Khomeini neared death, the
constitution was changed to allow for his successor Ali Khamenei, a junior cleric, to be qualified
for the position of Supreme Leader and to compensate for his lack of influence.2 The second was
Rafsanjani’s creation of bonyads (economic foundations) and selecting key IRGC commanders
to oversee them. By choosing Khamenei to succeed Khomeini, the clerical regime deepened the
political power of the IRGC and allowing its leaders to become involved in Iran’s economy
broadened its reach beyond the political sphere.3 However, it would never have garnered the
power that it has currently if not for the ambiguous nature of sovereignty at the heart of Iran’s
constitution and within its very name—Islamic Republic. The complex process of decision-
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making that resulted from that political system encouraged the development of informal
networks with which to wield influence and thus subverted any institution, which could have
been used to control the IRGC.
Theoretical Importance
Iran offers a good example of the difficulty of managing civil-military relations. In the
Middle East, the military to various degrees, depending on the state’s form of government, plays
an important role in politics. Generally, the more complicated the political system and the
greater degree of participation by the citizenry in the political process, the lesser the role of the
military. Because of the religious nature of Iran’s leadership, another dimension is added to its
dilemma of controlling the military’s political ambitions. Like other more participatory states, it
uses a highly ideological militia comprised of volunteers,4 but because of the dual sovereignty
written into Iran’s constitution and the lack of an adequate replacement for Khomeini, the IRGC
eventually displaced the Artesh as the preeminent security institution.5 Further, it has begun to
or at least has the potential to overtake the clerical regime itself,6 which means while they
succeeded in controlling the Artesh, they have failed to check the political ambitions of the
IRGC—the very military organization which was suppose to prevent the overthrow of the
Islamic Republic.
Policy Importance
The leadership in the United States did not demonstrate much aptitude for understanding
Iran nor seemed to even have the desire to acquire the ability to understand when Iran’s
leadership dynamics were at least more aligned with its constitution. It does not seem anymore
inclined to do so, even though the IRGC’s growing influence has made the task all the more
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complicated, which makes it all the more important.7 The IRGC has begun to interpose itself
into the realm of foreign affairs to the point of sidelining the institutions—the Foreign Ministry
and the Supreme National Security Council—which actually are responsible for implementing
policy.8 No matter the approach chosen to respond to Iran’s regional ambitions, without
knowing the internal dynamics of the IRGC and its place within Iran’s political system, prudent
courses of actions and the opportunities they may spawn will not avail themselves, save by
chance.
Literature Review
Militaries do not operate in a vacuum separate from the states they serve. Thus an
examination of Iran’s governing structures is necessary. Unfortunately, for the fifteen years after
the Iranian Revolution, western analysis produced only a meager understanding of its complex
political system, according to James A. Bill. He noted particularly that many western observers
predicted the collapse of the revolutionary regime because of the many points of friction both
within and between state institutions. They completely missed that the infighting between
factions and institutions was the reason for the regime’s survival. Nevertheless, Bill critiques
three papers by Mohsen Milani, Bahman Bakhtiari, and Kenneth Katzman, which move the
understanding of Iran’s political system in a more enlightened direction by looking at the efforts
to institutionalize the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, respectively, within the executive,
legislative, and military branches of the state.9
Milani examines the evolution of the relationship between the velayat-e faqih (Supreme
Leader) and the presidency, which he considered to be the two most important institutions to
come out the Islamic Revolution. He noted that the revolution’s founders were torn by their
3

desire for an Islamic state and the need to satisfy the demands of the nationalist and leftist
factions for representation. Thus the executive is split between those two different notions of
sovereignty—that of God embodied in the Supreme Leader and that of the people vested in the
presidency.10 Even as the former is theoretically supposed to take primacy when the two are in
conflict, after the death of Khomeini, it became a much weaker institution, unable to dominate
the latter. The expansion of the Supreme Leader’s constitutional powers did not change that
dynamic, leading to a sharing of power with the presidency and transferring power back to the
state.11
Though the Parliament of Iran wields little power, it is the institution which most directly
reflects the will of the public, and is no less a stranger to the factional politics of the executive.
Bakhtiari charts its development from its domination by the most radically minded to the more
pragmatic politicians who were supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. However, given that
the candidates must be certified by the Council of Guardians, comprised of senior clerics, the
parliament reflects its wishes along with those of the populace.12 Thus as the relation between
the two executives signals the strength of the revolutionary regime so too does the composition
of the parliament.
Contrary to Milani, Katzman views the IRGC as the most durable revolutionary
institution, pointing out that the velayat-e faqih almost died with Khomeini and in his absence
has been severely reduced in power. Thus it has not proved itself adaptable, one of the criteria
with which he used to determine the degree of an entity’s institutionalization, taking up the
model devised by Samuel Huntington. The other three criteria are autonomy, complexity, and
coherency.13 While Katzman rates the IRGC as passing Huntington’s test for institutionalization
4

on all accounts, he nevertheless views it as incomplete given its continued radical orientation. In
a way, he does fail it in the end on the autonomy score as it “remains an institutional legacy of
Khomeini’s vision.” So rather than fulfill the mission of a professional military of securing the
state, true to its origins its allegiance is to the velayat-e faqih.14 However the changes that
occurred in the aftermath of Khomeini’s death and the Iran-Iraq war turned the IRGC toward a
direction, not easily discernible to most observers in the early 1990s, and one that calls into
question Katzman’s conclusion.
In Olivier Roy’s, “The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy,” the rise of the secularization in
Iran is highlighted and how it resulted from the end of the dual legitimacy that Khomeini
embodied. This was reflected with the election of Khatami in 1997 against the wishes of
Khamenei. So the contradiction in the constitution between divine and popular sovereignty was
blown wide open.15 Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut seconded these observations in “Political and Social
Transformations in Post-Islamist Iran” and in addition noted that the social changes, which
ironically were put into motion by the modernization policies of the regime, reinforced the trend
towards secularization.16
While the reformers were heartened, believing Iran was on the path to becoming a truly
participatory democratic state, the IRGC leadership was displeased with the social and political
transformations taking place.17 This bears directly on the challenges of building capable
militaries which do not interfere in politics to the point of subverting or even overthrowing the
ruling regime. Mehran Kamrava examined this dilemma and the various solutions states have
implemented to deal with it in his “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in
the Middle East.” He fingers the enhanced corporate identity that comes with institutionalizing
5

the military as the core problem.18 It is that problem, intersecting with the social and political
changes occurring in the late 1990s, which lies at the crux of what the IRGC would become and
how it would get there. For the clerics would not sit by idly and see their power and all they had
worked for over two decades crumble into nothingness.
The election of Khatami was a blow to the conservative clerics who feared the loss of
their power. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr detail how they worked to concentrate power away
from the presidency in “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran.” They found allies in the IRGC
which being ever tied to the velayat-e faqih, stood to lose power as well, in its view, with the
expansion of civil society. This was because the Artesh which vastly outnumbers the IRGC
would be needed to prevent a coup based on the growing power of the civil society. Therefore,
since 1997, the IRGC has become much more prominent in the state apparatus.19 In contrast to
the focus on centralization and containment of factionalism by Gheissari and Nasr’s, Kazem
Alamdari looks at the evolution of Iran’s political system in “The Power Structure of the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to Clientelism, and Militarization of the
Government,” focusing on the increase in what he calls clientelism, which works against
centralization. However, he agrees with their assessment of a rising IRGC and in fact goes
further saying that the regime is trending towards a military dictatorship run by the IRGC.20
A monograph report by the RAND Corporation, Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the
Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, provides evidence for that trend.
It points to the fact that much of Iran’s leadership including the parliament and the presidency
itself along with his cabinet consists of IRGC veterans. While most analysis of the IRGC looks
at it from the perspective of threat assessment, Rise of the Pasdaran, views it holistically as a
6

socioeconomic entity. It also attempts to accurately place the IRGC in its role within Iran’s
security apparatus as it must contend with rival organizations for influence.21
Steven Ward takes an even more comprehensive view, in his book Immortal: A Military
History of Iran and Its Armed Forces, charting the history of Iran’s military from ancient Persia
to the present day. Interestingly he remarks that while fielding dual militaries is very unusual for
most states, it is only the latest manifestation of an Iranian tradition. Being a military history, it
focuses more on the rivalry between the Artesh and the Pasdaran, concluding that in the
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War the Pasdaran became the preeminent service, the true heirs to the
Shah’s military.22 A much more detailed analysis of the rivalry was performed by Arasli
Jahangir for his master’s thesis, “Pasdaran Incorporated: Evolving from Revolutionary Guard to
Praetorian Guard.” He shows that the clerical regime’s violation of the core principle of
interservice rivalry—treat each service equally—is what led to the IRGC’s transformation from
being a check on the Artesh to the first military force in modern Iranian history to operate as an
independent actor with the potential to overtake the state itself. However, he only touches on the
IRGC’s role in Iran’s economy,23
Ali Ansari’s “The Revolution Will Be Mercantilized” takes up that task, in which he
notes that as with its increase in political power, its influence in Iran’s economy increased
markedly after Khomeini’s death and the Iran-Iraq War. Rafsanjani’s attempt at integrating the
IRGC within the regular military structure had failed. Thus, he thought to liberalize them by
granting the IRGC a cut of the state’s oil revenue to use as seed money. It had the opposite
effect. A majority of the IRGC had actually voted for Khatami, and so its conservative
leadership which supported Khamenei purged the IRGC of any reformist elements. However, its
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economic power continued to increase in the absence of the reformists among its leadership. As
its influence has grown it seems as though it has come to care more about protecting its material
interests instead of the Iranian people.24
Another RAND monograph, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian
Leadership Dynamics, looks at the institutions, including the IRGC, of Iran involved in making
and carrying out decisions. Its decision-making process is defined by its overlapping
responsibilities and factionalism. Though it may slow the system to a crawl so that informal
networks are often more effective than official institutions and channels, it is also the method by
which the regime survives, 25 as noted almost two decades before by James A. Bill.26
Research Goals
The studies reviewed looked at only one or two factors, such as leadership, economics,
and religions/culture to explain the IRGC’s rise within Iran’s political economy. An attempt will
be made to demonstrate the effect of all of them on the nature and role of the IRGC. The study
that comes closest to this objective is RAND’s 2009 monograph, The Rise of the Pasdaran.
However, it does not discuss the role that the contradiction at the heart of the Islamic Republic
played in the Pasdaran’s rise to power. By doing so, the rest of the factors that helped determine
the political trajectory of the IRGC should logically unfold, and perhaps hint at its destination.
Research Organization
The second chapter covers the effect of that outcome on the development of Iran’s
economy along with a discussion of how conditions arose that were favorable for the Pasdaran
to achieve economic dominance. The third chapter examines the leadership dynamics of the
Islamic Republic, focusing on the period of reconstruction after the death of Khomeini and the
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end of the war with Iraq. Chapter four looks at the cultural and religious factors underlying the
avenue the Pasdaran exploited to increase their power. Finally, the fifth chapter consists of an
overview of the manner in which the Pasdaran rose to its present position, a discussion of what
may lie ahead for the Pasdaran, and subjects for future study.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF THE PASDARAN
Four major and interrelated issues had to be dealt with in the aftermath of the grueling
near-decadal war of attrition with Iraq. First and foremost was determining who would succeed
the Ayatollah Khomeini. The second resulted from the choice of Khamenei to become the next
Supreme Leader.27 As a junior cleric he did not have strong religious credentials and thus lacked
the influence within Iran’s political establishment to control then President Hashemi Rafsanjani.
(The issues surrounding the choice of Khamenei will be examined later.) Thus when Khamenei
sought an ally which would be powerful enough to compensate for his weakness he turned to the
Pasdaran.28 As a military organization whose allegiance is owed directly to the Supreme Leader
and the clerics rather than the government it was a natural fit.29 In return for their loyalty the
Pasdaran was granted preferable treatment.30
This brings the third issue into view, and the most important one with respect to the
direction of Iran’s economic system—the danger of the Pasdaran attempting to seize power, a
familiar scenario that often follows in the wake of a failed military expedition. Aware of this
danger, Rafsanjani attempted to integrate them into the conventional military branch, the Artesh,
which was at odds with Khamenei’s desire. Lastly, Iran’s economy in disarray, had to be rebuilt
which entailed a great deal of reconstruction and infrastructure development.31 Further, the
government’s budget would not be able to cover the costs of refitting its two militaries.32
Thinking that he could kill two birds with one stone, Rafsanjani took the opportunity to keep the
leadership of the Pasdaran satisfied by encouraging them to enter the economy and thus provide
additional funding for themselves via management of Iran’s bonyads (foundations).33 So
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interestingly, Rafsanjani’s solution dovetailed with Khamenei’s gambit to ensure the Pasdaran’s
backing against Rafsanjani.
The Foundation of the Pasdaran’s Economic Ascent
Despite the radical changes brought forth by the Iranian Revolution, the bonyads are
actually a holdover from the previous regime. The bonyad Mostazafan (Foundation of the
Oppressed or Mostazafan Foundation) is the direct successor to the Pahlavi foundation whose
assets were sequestered and transferred to the new foundation. Supposedly a charitable trust, it
is one of the largest foundations and is well-integrated into the economy. It is directly
influenced, though not owned by the Pasdaran.34
The Pasdaran’s own business ventures began rather humbly soon after the end of the
Iran-Iraq War with Rafsanjani providing the funding by granting it a cut of the state’s oil
revenues.35 With that seed money, the leadership of the Pasdaran began by confiscating several
factories, creating the Moavenat khodkafaee and Moavenat bassazi, headquarters of selfsufficiency and reconstruction, respectively. Both established companies in the agriculture,
industrial, mining, transportation, road, construction, and trade sectors. Desiring even greater
control, the Pasdaran shortly after created a reconstruction headquarters to be directly within
itself, which in 1990 became the gharargah sazandegi khatam alanbia (GHORB). Also called
Khatam al-Anbia (KAA), it is considered the Pasdaran’s engineering arm, similar to the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. Its board is comprised of the chiefs of the Pasdaran’s military
branches, the head of Imam Hossein University, the commanding officer of the IRGC
Cooperative Foundation, the head of the Pasdaran’s Self Sufficiency Directorate, and headed by
the commander-in-chief of the Iranian military, the Chief of Joint Forces Command. Employing
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25,000 engineers and staff, including roughly 2,500 IRGC members,36 it is one of Iran’s largest
contractors boasting of receiving 750 large infrastructure development projects and consulting on
an additional 170.37
This turn to entrepreneurship was reflective of the changing attitudes of Iranian society to
which the Pasdaran is tied more than its pretensions to the status of an elite “warrior caste”
allow them to admit. Unfortunately for the private sector, their new-found zeal for business did
not include notions of fair play. At the time they received their oil income, the exchange rate in
Iran was subsidized so that the hard currency they received could be used to import goods
effectively at a lower price and then sold to the public at the market rate for a huge profit. Their
advantages also extended to their connections in the state bureaucracy, which enabled them to
place their members in senior management positions at major Iranian firms. For instance,
Mohsen Rafiqdoost, one of the Pasdaran’s former commanders38—also Khomeini’s driver and
relative to Rafsanjani by marriage—became head of the Mostafazan Foundation.39 Such
networking would prove to be crucial for the Pasdaran’s economic expansion.
The economic conditions in Iran during the late 1980s and early 1990s were tumultuous
as the Iran-Iraq War had just concluded40 with Khomeini dying soon afterward on June 6,
1989,41 leaving Khamenei as Supreme Leader. So Rafsanjani formed a deal with the bazaar
merchants: they would effectively finance the state and in return he would create an unregulated
environment conducive to their short-term investments. However, the resulting web of informal
relations and oligopolies was hostile to the kinds of long-term investments which would have
established a sound foundation for broad-based economic development. Through the 1990s, the
bonyads made those affiliated with them very wealthy as they controlled and distributed billions
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of dollars. Being unaccountable to no one save for the Supreme Leader, politics became defined
more by economic transactions than had been the case under the clerics during the 1980s, as the
bonyads replaced the latter as the generators of wealth. As of the summer of 2009, it is estimated
that the bonyads control 10-20% of Iran’s economy.42
Yet before their dominance began to become entrenched, there was a pushback by the
public and some reformist politicians and clerics against the regime in general and the Pasdaran
in particular. This dissatisfaction was manifested in the election of Mohammad Khatami to the
presidency in 1997. It proved more difficult to hold the Pasdaran and its bureaucratic allies to
account than perhaps he first imagined. During the latter portion of Rafsanjani’s presidency, the
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was tasked with investigating the business
operations of the Pasdaran. Much to his consternation, instead of shutting down the Pasdaran’s
profiteering scheme, when they saw how easy it was to implement, they started engaging in the
corrupt practice themselves. Khatami rooted out those in the ministry involved, but many of
them just moved over into the Pasdaran and continued their operations.43
Ironically the very programs of modernization which powered the Pasdaran’s economic
fortunes as well as the Revolution itself also resulted in the twin developments which would
cause much of the public to turn against them—increasing urbanization and literacy.44 In
combination with the turn towards economic matters, the general public began to demand more
political liberties, which made the ruling clerics and the leadership of the Pasdaran nervous.
They feared that such sentiments would mean the end of the ideals of the Revolution, and at least
as importantly their own power. In fact, even in the Pasdaran, many of whose members are
conscripts, the majority actually voted for Khatami. Thus, its leaders sought to roll back the tide
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first within their own ranks by purging any elements that were sympathetic to the reformers,
increasing the conservative nature of the institution. For the next several years, however, they
kept a lower profile, biding their time while their economic assets continued to grow, increasing
their financial independence. They would accomplish that by setting up front companies by
which they could then take over whole sectors of Iran’s economy.45
The Failed Pushback against the Pasdaran
Up until that time, the Pasdaran commanders were content to gain their profits through
commissions and use their state connections to bring in profitable contracts. Under that system,
they had benefitted from their close relations with the clerics and the Supreme Leader, enabling
them to receive contracts for large construction projects, often on a no-bid basis. While many,
especially in the private sector, felt that the Pasdaran-affiliated firms had an unfair advantage,
each time such contracts were granted a state official was ready with an explanation to justify the
lack of competition.46 Even with competitive projects, GHORB’s formidable size and use of
conscripted soldiers as labor allowed it underbid private firms which have also been handicapped
by the bonyads’ special access to credit at state-owned banks and the breaks they are granted on
taxation and import duties, providing opportunities for corruption.47 Further, the economy’s
most advanced technology is produced under the Pasdaran, as it monopolizes the
commercialization of military technology. This was the result of the military industrial
companies, created by the Shah in the early 1960s to increase Iran’s self-sufficiency in weapons
manufacturing, being handed to the Pasdaran by Khomeini.48
The Pasdaran justifies its economic activities by claiming that such a role is actually
stipulated in the constitution of the Islamic Republic under article 147.49 Then commander of the
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Pasdaran, Yahya Rahim Safavi, went further, believing that not only did the Pasdaran have the
authority but was also required to perform such a role.50 Also cited is Article 150, which assigns
the role of guarding the Revolution to the Pasdaran. However the Pasdaran has interpreted that
competence so broadly as to render the constitution meaningless beyond what the will of
Khamenei commands, which currently supports the Pasdaran. Thus, they can lay claim to any
project they see fit to sequester.51
Their efforts accelerated upon the expiration of Khatami’s second term in 2005.52 The
Council of Guardians, a twelve-member body of six clerics and six Islamic jurors, denied many
reformists candidates the chance to run in the 2004 parliamentary and 2005 presidential
elections.53 This winnowing left the door wide open for conservatives to get elected to
parliament, many of which were former members of the Pasdaran. Of those running for
president, four were Pasdaran alumni, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who ultimately won.54
With their newfound political power they were able to steer scrutiny away from their extralegal
activities and expand the scope of their economic influence.
A little more than a month before Ahmadinejad’s victory, Khamenei reinforced this
further by issuing a decree that reinterpreted Article 44 of Iran’s constitution such that it
effectively nullified its stipulation of a planned economy. In addition to the state and private
sectors, Article 44 defined a cooperative sector consisting of enterprises dealing with production
and distribution. Khamenei’s five-year privatization plan consisted of cutting the state budget by
20 percent annually, so that by its end 25% of the economy would be transferred to the
cooperative sector. His decree was codified into law on January 28, 2008. Privatizing $110-120
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billion in assets, Ahmadinejad boasted that Iran had achieved in a mere five years the same level
of privatization as the Eastern Europeans, who required twenty years.55
However, Iranian economists expressed concern over the decree mainly because they
feared that state monopolies would actually be strengthened rather than diminished by the
measures. The lack of transparency in the privatization process meant that the domestic private
sector was largely barred from buying state assets. Moreover, they feared competition would be
curtailed as antitrust legislation was not forthcoming and the current law made foreign direct
investment difficult. These fears turned out not to be unwarranted as Ali Larijani, the
parliamentary speaker, criticized the law noting it did not include “the genuine private sector,”
which had only acquired 19% of the state-owned enterprises (SOE) over the period from 20052009. The public nonstate sector purchased 12.5% with the remaining 68.5% being transferred
to the cooperative sector.56
Beyond a dearth of competition, the most serious consequence of Khamenei’s decree was
the transfer of assets from the open to the more opaque areas of the public sector such as the
foundations and their subsidiaries owned by the Pasdaran and the Basij. Such purchases are
funded by their credit and finance institutions which they claim are noninterest Islamic banks but
on the contrary perform everything but interest-free loans.57 This decrease in transparency was
highlighted when the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) criticized the bidding
process and the quality of GHORB’s work. Its case was certainly credible, as just the year
before on June 25, GHORB was awarded a no-bid contract by the National Oil Company of Iran
for the fifteenth and sixteenth development phases of the South Pars Gas Field. Given that this is
one of Iran’s most valuable gas development projects, it is unsurprising that several members of
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parliament demanded an inquiry into the bidding procedure. Yet, their calls for an inquiry were
ignored. Despite this and many other similar anomalous cases, instead of investigating GHORB
to discover the extent of its malfeasance, Ahmadinejad placed the MPO under his control by
decree in July 2007. 58
The Spoils and Freedom of Economic Dominance
A couple cases since that decree was issued demonstrate the growing economic power of
the Pasdaran, resulting from their increased political influence. In 2009, the subsidiary Mehr-e
Eghtesad-e Iranian Investment Company was caught engaging in fraud over the purchase of an
Angouran zinc minde in Zanjan Province for a mere $186 million when the real value is closer to
$1 billion. The fraudulent deal prompted a firestorm of criticism with one cleric, hojattolah
eslam Mohammad-Taghi Vaezi exclaiming, “It would have been better if they had given it
away.” When the Supreme Audit Court examined the deal, they discovered that not only were
all three of the firms competing for the sale of the same corporate family but that the signatures
on their applications were all in the same handwriting. With this evidence, the court struck down
the deal.59
The other example occurred in May the following year and was even more egregious,
perhaps because it involved an oil and natural gas development project, an area which the
Pasdaran dominates. President Ahmadinejad himself told GHORB commanders and executives
a couple months before in February to be prepared to receive more oil and gas development
contracts “to satisfy the domestic needs of the country.” In March, GHORB was granted a nobid contract worth $7 billion upon the withdrawal of Turkish companies from the third phase of
the South Pars oil and gas fields development project. On May 13, 2010, GHORB’s commander,
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General Rostam Qasemi, told Ali Larijani that the Pasdaran was taking over the third
development phase. In doing so he replaced energy giants Shell and Total.60
Perhaps the most brazen instance of the Pasdaran’s interference in an infrastructure
development project actually came before the election of Ahmadinejad, in August 2004. Yet it
calls attention to the Pasdaran’s most flagrant extralegal activities—its smuggling operations.
The Turkish company Tepe-Akfen-Vie was under contract to operate the new Imam Khomeini
International airport, south of Tehran. On its first day of operations the Pasdaran forced the
second airplane to abort its landing and blocked the runway to prevent any further attempts,
making clear that they would not accept foreign management of the airport. Officials annulled
the contracts at a substantial penalty and the Pasdaran forced the impeachment of transportation
minister Ahmad Khorram.61 It is probable that in addition to expressing displeasure at their
engineering branch losing the contract to the Turks they were protecting their smuggling
operations as they would have much less control over a foreign firms’ security procedures.62
The Pasdaran have enormous control over the borders and airports,63 which affords them
the opportunity to deal in the trade of illicit goods including luxury items, cell phones, makeup,
subsidized gas, drugs, and alcohol. Their operations are very profitable earning them an
estimated $12 billion annually, the magnitude of which suggests the contraband must be
smuggled using ekeleh-ha-ye namar’i (invisible jetties) operating along the 1,500-mile coastline
of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.64 However, this profiteering over items which are not in
keeping with the ideals of the Revolution to say the least has caused divisions between the old
guard who fought in the Iran-Iraq War and the new guard who have no memory of the
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Revolution.65 However, in spite of these divisions, the Pasdaran has demonstrated dominance in
the trade and energy portions of the economy.
Along with their ability to procure favorable budgets with its network of lobbyists,
influential faction in the parliament, and access to the Supreme Leader, their sources of revenue
beyond what the government grants them not only afford them influence but also independence
from state control. Their most important revenue stream likely flows from the huge financial
assets of the bonyads generated (as mentioned previously) by active Pasdaran and its alumni
since the early 1990s. These funds were distributed on a patronage basis to commanders and
veterans by the Supreme Leader as Khamenei sought to seal their loyalty, but as the bonyads are
not accountable to state institutions their transactions lack transparency and oversight. This was
the tradeoff that Khamenei made to secure his position.66
The Pasdaran’s gains do not come, though, without some drawbacks themselves. Their
increased economic power makes them vulnerable to both external and internal forces. The
United States and the international community through the United Nations have focused recently
on sanctioning specific companies affiliated with and individuals among the leadership of the
Pasdaran. While the affect of such measures is debatable with some saying that they may
actually increase the Pasdaran’s economic influence, as they could always just set up other front
companies, and thrive in a space of reduced competition,67 where they are vulnerable is the
source of their revenue stream—the financial institutions.68 Also, within Iran resentment is
growing especially among the middle class and the bazaar merchants who are not allied with the
Pasdaran, against their corrupt business practices. The Pasdaran hopes to overcome this
through its state connections and its rural development programs, many of which are now run by
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the Basij.69 However, as has been the case since the protests over the results of the 2009
presidential election, the stability of the present regime is not the guarantee against the loss of
their power they hope it to be. Further their development programs are in part the reason for the
backlash amongst the educated masses in the first place. This means that if they are attempting
to purchase the support of the rural population with development programs to offset the
animosity of the urban classes, their efforts are likely to be self-defeating in the long run, as the
latter’s relative numbers continue to grow.70 Lastly, it is possible that they may succumb to the
factionalism endemic to the rest of Iran’s state institutions, if its leaders decide to fight over the
spoils or differences in worldview.71
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the independence the Pasdaran has carved out
for itself presents the rather startling situation where for the first time in the modern history of
Iran a military institution has the potential to overthrow the state and form a new regime.72 This
begs the question, “Why would the Supreme Leader be willing to secure their loyalty in a
manner that included such a high risk scenario,” particularly given that the Pasdaran was created
by Khomeini to safeguard the clerical regime and the ideals of its Revolution. The answer to that
query lies within the power structure of Iran’s leadership.
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CHAPTER 3: THE LEADERSHIP STRUCTURES OF IRAN
From the beginning of the Iranian Revolution to the present, the leadership structures of
the Islamic Republic have undergone significant changes. The one that has proved to be most
important throughout its development is the shifting power between the Supreme Leader and the
President, representing the two sources of legitimacy undergirding the Islamic Republic. Such
shifts occurred both constitutionally and informally. Thus it is important to note the nature of the
individuals holding the leadership positions as well as the nature of the positions themselves. To
gain a better sense of the former, first a delineation of the responsibilities and powers of the latter
under the present system will be given. With that in hand, an accounting of the shifting power
structure of the Islamic Republic will shed more light on the mechanisms which allowed the
Pasdaran to attain its great political influence, and how that path arose in the first place.
The Current Order
At the head of the Islamic Republic sits the Supreme Leader who is appointed for life by
the 86-member body called the Assembly of Experts. Based on Khomeini’s notion of the
velayat-e faqih (rule of the jurist), the position was codified into Iran’s constitution in which he
is mandated to both set the government’s general policies and oversee their implementation. In
addition to ratifying the public’s choice of president and directly appointing senior officials, he
may place numerous representatives within the state bureaucracy to act as his eyes and ears.
Importantly, he is the commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces and appoints the commanders
of the Pasdaran, the Artesh, and the Joint Staff.73
The second highest ranking official behind the Supreme Leader is the President whose
duties include daily administration and enforcing the constitution. As leader of the executive
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branch he implements the laws passed in the Majlis, Iran’s parliament, or referenda and signs
treaties and other international agreements. The cabinet members are appointed by him upon
ratification by the Majlis. He also appoints the heads of the bonyads, a power of great import as
was discussed previously with Rafsanjani. While the power that the Supreme Leader wields
vastly exceeds that of the President the positions have overlapping areas of control such as
national security, as the latter is chair of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Iran’s
principle defense policy board.74
As the only elected body, the 290-member Majlis is the only branch of the government
which reflects the will of the people, at least in part, since the candidates must be vetted by the
Council of Guardians. Its powers include oversight of government budgets, crafting legislation,
ratification of international treaties, and reviewing the president and his ministers.75 Given that
the Council of Guardians must approve the candidates and that the elections within that context
are by and large fair and free, the composition of the Majlis reflects both the wishes of the public
and the Supreme Leader.76 Thus the composition of the Majlis can be an indicator of the
strength of the relationship and the concordance between the Supreme Leader and the President,
as will be seen.
The function of the 12-member Council of Guardians is at is name suggests, to the guard
the Revolution. It accomplishes this by screening candidates for the presidency as well as the
Majlis, and using their constitutional authority of review to block legislation which they deem
unIslamic. Thus it is the legislative expression of the dual, but unequal, sovereignty at the heart
of the Islamic Republic. However, when the Majlis and the Council of Guardians are in
deadlock, the Expediency Council, a body of 35-40 members currently chaired by Rafsanjani,
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steps into resolve the matter. In addition to the Council of Guardians, the 1979 constitution
created an independent judiciary branch, which nominates the six lay members of the Council of
Guardians. The head of the judiciary is chosen by none other than the Supreme Leader.77
Establishing a New Form of Government
The structure described above includes some modifications of the original constitution
established in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. Being in its formative stages, the
revolution needed a figure such as the Ayatollah Khomeini to consolidate and begin the process
of institutionalizing his vision for a new government based on his idea of the velayat-e faqih
(whose origins will be related in the next chapter).78 Unfortunately for him and his Islamist
disciples, he was not able to institute a pure theocracy with the clerics ruling without hindrance
from any republican institutions. For among the potpourri of revolutionaries, there existed
nationalists and leftists as well as Islamists, who demanded that republicanism be incorporated
into the new government. The result was an Islamic Republic with both theocratic and
republican elements to match its two sources of sovereignty—divine and popular.79
If the latter was nonnegotiable, the Islamists had their own demand—the new republic
must be completely compatible with the velayat-e faqih. The question then became how to
resolve theocracy, which the Jewish historian Josephus—who coined the term—defined as a
government whose rulers claim to act on behalf of their deity, and republicanism based on
popular sovereignty where the will of the people is supreme. Ayatollah Mohammed Hosayn
Beheshti who wrote the velayat-e faqih portion of the constitution understood the two were
contradictory. He rationalized that in voting for the Islamic Republic the people had voted for
maktab (Islam) and therefore limited their future choices. Thus Islam would determine the
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nature of the republic rather than vice versa such that when at any point the two conflicted Islam
would take precedence.80
In so far as a solution could be found, Behesthi’s proved sufficient for the public and the
clerics. However, given that the source of political and religious power is embodied in the faqih,
as Behesthi noted, two qualifications were necessary for an individual to be fit for the position.
He must be both a leading marja and have the support of the majority of the people. In this vein
the framers of the Islamic Republic imbued the faqih with powers exceeding that of the Shah
under the 1906 constitution. Moreover, given Khomeini’s informal powers due to his charisma
and history of uncompromising opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty, he was akin to a fourth branch
of government more powerful than the three formal branches.81
Yet the faqih was not considered a dictator, as it was believed that such a person would
be above earthly temptation and abuse. On the contrary, looking uncomfortably at the example
of Libya and Iraq, the framers were very much worried about a strong president overthrowing the
new government to establish a dictatorship. Thus the popular executive was split between a
Prime Minister and a President with the latter placed under the former.82 The mechanism was
shown to work as both Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and President Bani-Sadr tried to
challenge Khomeini, who had worked to develop the revolutionary institutions into a mini-state
within a state, and failed miserably. When Khamenei assumed the office of the Presidency he
accepted his subordinate position both to the faqih and the Prime Minister resolving the
constitution’s lack of a mechanism to overcoming differences between the two executives.83 Yet
the tension between the institutions themselves is seen right from the beginning and would grow
much more prominent as the nature of the Islamic Republic and the manifestations of both its
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sovereignties evolved. This friction-driven evolution which results from the tension between the
Islamic Republic’s dual sovereignty is the key to understanding how events would unfold after
the death of Khomeini and why Khamenei was chosen to succeed him.
From Consolidation to Restoration
With the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic entered a new phase coming
from consolidation and institutionalization to recuperation and reconstruction. The looming
death of Khomeini afforded the opportunity to make the modifications to the 1979 constitution
necessary to meet those challenges so that the republic could survive. 84 The changes were also
needed because the Ayatollah Ali Montazeri was forced to resign as Khomeini’s designated
successor. Montazeri had begun to espouse political views which Khomeini realized made him
undependable to carry on his legacy and the other grand ayatollahs could not be relied upon
either as they disagreed with clerical rule.85 So the clerical regime was presented with a
dilemma. The constitution required someone who was a marja—supported by the public—and
was a competent manager. Since Khomeini rejected all the ayatollahs who supported him as not
fitting the latter criteria he decided to relax the religious requirement.86
This is an interesting choice for a theocratic government because the logical solution
would seemingly be to relax the managerial requirement given that the constitution itself
demands that Islamic authority take precedence. Yet Khomeini, author of the velayat-e faqih
himself, chose then President Khamenei, a mere hojattolah eslam (middle-ranking cleric), to
succeed him, and his clerical supporters concurred with his decision. So either they considered
leadership ability to be inextricably tied to religious authority or their faith in Islam was not quite
what they claimed it to be and the whole ideal of the velayat-e faqih in the end was nothing more
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than an elaborate religious cloak for autocracy. No matter the case, the clerics of the prestigious
seminaries in Qom bristled upon hearing of Khamenei’s succession, introducing a point of
contention not from dissidents but from within the clerical regime’s own ranks.87
In addition to relaxing the requirements for the Supreme Leader, his constitutional
powers were actually increased to compensate for Khamenei’s lack of religious credentials. On
the recommendation of both Khamenei and Rafsanjani, the powers of the presidency were also
increased as they felt that the problems of the Islamic Republic during its first decade boiled
down to the weakness of that office. Yet as mentioned previously, there was tension between
both the office and the two personalities. Khamenei felt he must carry on the legacy of his
predecessor to secure the allegiance of the latter’s network of supporters as to consolidate his
position, while Rafsanjani sought to “normalize” the Islamic Republic, attempting to push it
towards a more pragmatic disposition. 88 In part, Khamenei’s need to shore up his support was
to check Rafsanjani’s influence, which was actually greater than his, evidenced by his
conspicuous absence in the foreign press during his first year as Supreme Leader. The headlines
instead bear Rafsanjani’s name over reports on his economic plans and initiatives to rebuild Iran.
More fundamentally, the tension resulted from the reality that the two of them now embodied
separately what Khomeini encompassed alone.89
At first Khamenei moved cautiously, remaining neutral in factional disputes90 but even as
he grew more confident and assertive his lack of political and religious influence meant power
flowed away from the faqih so that the state, became the central player in the Islamic Republic
for the first time.91 Thus the revolution had transitioned from a period of consolidation and
institutionalization to reconstruction and restoration, as Khomeini had died and the country had
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been ravaged by nearly a decade of war. That transition would not have occurred without
Khamenei’s concurrence which he may have given out of recognition that the faqih did not have
the power necessary to implement the policies to begin the long road to rebuilding Iran so that
the Islamic Republic could survive. Rafsanjani took advantage of this weakness and attempted
to centralize power. He did this by trying to resolve the differences between the Shah-era and
revolutionary institutions. For instance, he created a unified command structure for the IRGC
and the regular armed forces. However, he left the bonyads untouched as their capital was
crucial to funding the reconstruction of Iran.92 Even more importantly, Khamenei while initially
partnering with Rafsanjani actually supported his measures for his own reasons which were at
odds with those of Rafsanjani, the main one ironically enough being the desire to contain his
influence. Thus it is hardly surprising that the two reached an impasse as Khamenei’s
confidence grew stronger. .
The Clerics Strike Back
Rafsanjani’s second term as President proffered the conservative faction the chance to
role back the influence of the more pragmatic factions, which favored reconciliation with the
West, and for Khamenei to solidify his position. They suffered a large setback when their
chosen candidate Ali Nateq-Nouri lost the presidential election to Mohammad Khatami in 1997.
Thus, the conservative faction was put on the defensive, especially its leader, Khamenei, as
Khatami’s victory stood as a challenge to his authority demonstrating that he was neither popular
nor respected. Worse still, he was shown to be unable to fulfill the demands of his supporters
just as he was beginning to establish his own network apart from that of his predecessor.
Remember that their original plan was to roll back the pragmatists represented by Rafsanjani, as
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they feared it would mean the end of the Islamic Republic, but instead not only was that
objective unable to be fulfilled, now they had to deal with the real reformers who actively and
openly declared their support for a true republic. So the alliance that had been forged with the
Pasdaran from the beginning took on a heightened importance as the conservatives looked to
them to save the regime from the reformers.93
Apart from its loyalty to Supreme Leader, the Pasdaran was self-motivated to protect the
regime. If the expansion of civil society were to pose a sufficient threat to require a violent
putdown, the Artesh rather than the Pasdaran, which outnumbers them three fold, would be
called upon to fulfill that task. In such a scenario, the Artesh would likely challenge their current
status and power, or worse garner the ambition to takeover themselves. Were that to happen, the
Pasdaran rightly feared that it would face a fate similar to the purge of the Artesh in the wake of
the Revolution, which certainly has not forgotten it. Finally, gaining political power would
block the United States from using the reformers or the Artesh to instigate a velvet revolution,
incidentally, a prospect, the present commander of the Pasdaran, Mohmmad Ali Jafari believes
to be the greatest threat to the Islamic Republic.94
In that vein, it may also have sought to chill the recently warming relations between the
United States and Iran since the 9/11 attacks spawned cooperation to take on their common
enemy—the Taliban. The interception of the Karine A, a ship which was allegedly hauling
weapons to the Palestinian Authority, may have, accomplished that aim, in part.95 As it was in
the political interest of the IRGC to have a more hostile United States divert attention away from
its growing influence, it is not implausible that it under took the operation independently.96
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A number of methods were used to hold back the reformers from implementing any
changes seen to be a threat to the regime. In addition to using shock troops associated with the
Pasdaran and MOIS to crackdown on reformers violently, the clerics control of the Guardian
Council, Expediency Council, and the judiciary to effectively circumscribe Khatami and the
Majlis from carrying out the reforms their supporters were so hopeful would emerge. Freedom
of the press and efforts to strength civil society were squelched. It also took advantage of the
parastatal networks, which result from the state apparatus’ maze of bureaucracies with
overlapping duties, to bypassing the reformers entirely, enabling Khamenei to implement
policies with those whom he had chosen and controlled.97
After inoculating the regime from the reformers the next step was to take back control of
the Majlis and the presidency as to seal their hold on power. For the eight years Khatami was in
office, there were in effect two parallel governments, and the reformists’ support was still strong.
Thus the clerical regime decided essentially to stage a constitutional coup whereby the Council
of Guardians would use its power of selection to screen any electoral candidates that held even a
whiff of reformist credentials. In the presidential elections, the Council of Guardians approved
only 6 out of 1010 candidates, later on adding two on the order of the Supreme Leader. Half of
the candidates who passed their screening were IRGC commanders and two of the others were
clerics. The four commanders were Ali Larijani, the former director of state TV and radio
networks, Mohammad Baqer Qalibal, the former police chief of Tehran, Mohsen Rezaie, speaker
of the Expediency Council, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the mayor of Tehran, who ultimately
won the election.
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Besides the disqualification of the reformist candidates, two factors that led to
Ahmadinejad’s victory were the IRGC/Basij and his anti-establishment message. While
Rafsanjani acidly denounced what he claimed was the regime’s orchestrated defamation
campaign against him and his family, he chose not to contest the election, knowing from his long
time in politics that such a challenge would be useless. Two of the other losing candidates,
Mehdi Karoubi and Mostfa Moin, joined him in denouncing the regime, claiming that wellfinanced elements of it had illegally supported Ahmadinejad’s campaign. Mohammad Reza
Khatami, Moin’s running mate and son of the outgoing president, went further declaring that
they “were defeated by a garrison party.”98 He went on to say the following:
Until 3 days before the election, everything was fine, then after a military coup was
launched, of which we only learned later, an order was given to a specific military organization to
support a specific candidate, a person whom all the left-wing and right-wing pre-election polls had
shown to be the least favorite among 7 candidates.99

His words receive some support in the expression of gratitude General Mohammad Baqer
Zolqar, deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC gave to the Basij in a speech. If their claims are
valid such actions would not only be illegal but also violate Khomeini’s principle of the
military’s neutrality where politics is concerned.100
The Struggle for Mastery
Though the consensus appears to be that the Pasdaran increased its political footprint
after their electoral victories, it must be pointed out that when Barbara Slavin interviewed
Mohsen Rezaie, the second commander of the Pasdaran, he insisted that its political influence
has not changed greatly. He claimed that it is just that the media pays more attention to its
veterans which have long played active roles in the government. 101 Nevertheless, this is the
point where the Pasdaran’s economic power and clerical ties translated into formal political
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power, having won control over numerous town and city councils, about a third of the seats in
the Majlis, and of course the presidency. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an ex-Basiji, began
appointing security and military people to cabinet positions, demonstrating the increasing
militarization of the regime102 to the point where the Pasdaran commanders have all but sealed
their seizure of power.103 As the Pasdaran’s star rose, the clerics including Khamenei’s fell.
The way was now open for the Pasdaran to further its economic dominance, increasing its
ability to resist the regime both financially and politically, as was mentioned at the end of the
previous chapter.
Such was the increase in its power that for a time the relationship between the Supreme
Leader, the clerics, and the IRGC was unclear. Was it rule by politburo with the Supreme
Leader acting as a mere figurehead for the IRGC/clerical government? Or, was Khamenei truly
in charge, managing both the clerics and the IRGC? Though it initially looked as if the
relationship was closer to the politburo with the SNSC acting as the executive, it is clear now
that Khamenei’s preference is to rule personally. Yet this does not mean that he will not face a
challenge by the IRGC, especially if he is weakened by a challenge from Rafsanjani, bringing
the post-Khomeini Islamic Republic full circle.104
Though Khamenei still controls the oil revenue he can no longer take his base of support
amongst the clerics and the IRGC and Basij for granted. In the aftermath of the 2009
presidential election, Khamenei’s authority declined sharply as many clerics, including the
influential groups of clergy in Qom and members of parliament, demanded in public (albeit
unsigned) letters that the Assembly of Experts determine whether he is still fit to be Supreme
Leader. Just as importantly, he is in danger of losing his military muscle in the IRGC as its
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control of Iran’s political economy is nearly complete. At some point they may see fit to give
him an offer he cannot refuse.105
Perhaps Khamenei erred in openly siding with Ahmadinejad, but he may have only
accelerated trends which were put into motion the day he took over from Khomeini. The
dispersal of both religious and political authority resulting from his ascension is more in line
with the majority of Shia tradition. This suggests that the foundation upon which Khomeini built
the Islamic Republic is not resilient enough to adapt to changing circumstances, evinced by the
Pasdaran’s rise at the clerics’ expense. How that foundation combined with the Pasdaran’s
sense of itself to enable it to exploit the leadership structures for its own advantage is the subject
of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS
The Islamic Republic is an odd formulation having both republican and theocratic
elements. Though its constitutional basis has been discussed, what informed the ideas behind
that basis and how did those ideas affect the evolution of the revolutionary government,
particularly with respect to the role of the Pasdaran as its guardian? How were they able to gain
prominence over their security peers when the factional nature of the clerical regime and the
Pasdaran itself suggests that it could have seen its power divided and thus kept it in check?
Also, what of the future? As was mentioned in chapter two, the dominant economic player has
shifted in the past from the clerics to the bonyads and then to the Pasdaran itself, implying that it
may at some point be surpassed by another collection of networks. Yet, the Pasdaran has unique
qualities which cast some doubt on that trend, namely a strong identity among its officer corps
and close proximity to the Supreme Leader. Further, the clerics have been weakened by the
increasing secularization of Iranian society, opening the way for the Pasdaran to ascend all the
way to the top.
The Foundation of the Velayat-e Faqih
For most of its history, Shia Islam held the view that clerics should remain outside
positions of state power, exercising influence indirectly. However around the late 18th
century,106 during the Qajar dynasty,107 clerical leadership became institutionalized, with the
emergence of mujtahids. These were the clerical leaders from whom individual Shia had to
choose to follow as disciples. The mujtahid had the authority to hand out diplomas for religious
scholarship and take religious offerings, establishing an independent source of revenue, enabling
them to resist the rule of the Qajars.108 Though they had decreased in stature during the Pahlavi
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dynasty,109 in that period Khomeini devised his notion of the velayat-e faqih, extrapolating from
that clerical system to one where a grand mujtahid—the marja-i taqlid—would be chosen for all
to follow.110
Khomeini justified this by interpreting the infallibility of the Twelve Imams literally.
Such a leader would serve as the vicegerent of the Hidden Imam until his return,111 similar in
principle to the Catholic belief that the Pope whose Latin title is Vicarius Filii Dei, (Vicar of
Christ) represents God on earth. The major difference, of course besides the person being
represented, is that while both espouse the view that the clergy should interpret scripture for the
masses, Khomeini believed that that also implied a direct political as well as a religious role.
Thus did the Islamic Republic conjoin the two corresponding legitimacies—the velayat-e faqih
(the mandate of the jurist) and the agah be zaman (one who understands his time) with the latter
providing the basis for leading the masses.112
Khomeini felt that he and he alone had the characteristics required of such a leader.
Indeed, he was formidable. “First, and above all else, he was the most emotional and inventive
charismatic leader of recent times,” his influence extending to millions of Muslims across the
world. He empowered them by evoking within them a personal as well as a collective identity,
one based in historical rootedness filling them with pride and even a feeling of superiority. This
personal charisma then inculcated a symbiotic relationship between himself and his followers
with belief in his special abilities acting as the conduit of his leadership. In addition to this
personal charisma, he possessed the charisma emanating from his position as the highest ranking
ayatollah in Shia Islam.113 These qualities allowed him to embody the twin ideals of the
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Revolution, but upon his death there was no one to take his place, spawning a conceptual as well
as a political dilemma.114
The Islamic Republic’s Fatal Flaw
As was discussed in the previous chapter, with the death of Khomeini, the dual
legitimacy was no longer embodied within a single leader. Answering the question over which
basis for rule takes precedence became of paramount importance. The clerical regime chose the
political role as the most essential, but that was only the immediate dilemma. Other problems
cropped up as outgrowths both of that choice and the nature of the Islamic Republic from its
inception. Again as brought up before, if politics takes precedence what of the Islamic
Republic’s constitution which demands the opposite? Yet, the dilemma was that if the dual
sovereignties were divided into two positions with it would mean admitting the defeat of the
Islamic Revolution and Khomeini’s vision of clerical rule would come to an end. Khomeini tried
to have Khamenei declared a marja115 but Qom already incensed at the selection of a mere
hojattolah eslam was known to heavily disapprove of such a move so it was dropped.116
Entrenching further with his choice of Khamenei as his successor, however, only
sharpened the contradictions so that the price paid for continuing the Revolutionary ideal of
clerical rule was the politicization of religion, and paradoxically at the same time the declericalization of the body politic. This was evident even before the election of Khatami in the
composition of the Majlis whose membership by 1996 was down to 50 clerics from its peak of
125 in 1987. In addition, six of the clerical members of the Expediency Council were stripped of
their right to vote on non-constitutional matters.117
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The clerics and Iranian people are divided over how to confront these conceptual and
political contradictions, or indeed, whether to confront them at all. Given the paradoxical nature
of the problems that have arisen it is difficult to classify the various factions as simply reformist
or traditional. Therefore, Olivier Roy established a criterion based on each group’s position on
the velayat-e faqih. The hardliners are those who favor the status quo. Those who could be
called the reformist hardliners (though he does not label them as such) favor the institution of the
velayat-e faqih but believe that Montazeri should have succeeded Khomeini rather than
Khamenei. The two other factions reject the concept of the velayat-e faqih outright. However,
while the traditionalists reject both Khamenei and his office, the other more moderate faction
rejects only the latter. These positions are unsurprising as the lower ranking clerics have the
most to lose, a rather curious aspect of the Revolution being that it was the hojattolah eslam who
gained positions of power rather than the grand ayatollahs.118
Yet the dilemmas themselves do not present the whole story, though they hint at it. Is it
possible that in order for the velayat-e faqih to function as Khomeini designed, politics had to
take precedence? A more careful look at the constitution of the Islamic Republic and the
modifications made a decade into its history provides supporting evidence that it does, as politics
trumped religion from the beginning. Sharia is subordinated to state law as there are
discrepancies between their conceptions of citizenship and equality of the sexes. Consider, also,
the manner in which even the Supreme Leader is appointed. Traditionally, a marja was selected
by his peers with little public say in the matter, but given that the Supreme Leader has no peer
the Assembly of Experts is charged with appointing him. Though that body is elected by the
public, the Council of Guardians selects the candidates. As the members of that clerical body are
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appointed by the Supreme Leader rather than the ayatollahs as would be dictated by tradition the
political institution again is primary. Looking at the Expediency Council once more illustrates
the same pattern. For what purpose did Khomeini create that body? To be sure, he intended it to
ameliorate the gridlock resulting from the Council of Guardians’ veto power over the Majlis, but
in effect it deprived the clerics of the last say on legislative matters.119
Why is the initial relation between the two legitimacies relevant for the evolution of the
Pasdaran’s power? If political legitimacy was placed above religious legitimacy from the very
beginning that strongly supports the case for the argument that the concept of clerical rule itself
was unstable and that the Pasdaran’s increase in power was but one artifact of that instability.
That artifact is then just the outcome of the particular relative power configuration of the various
players involved and the dynamics of Iran’s leadership structures flowing from it. It is unstable
because in order for the velayat-e faqih to function as a principle of governance it must subvert
its own supporting ideology, leading to its eventual unraveling over time, as popular sovereignty
must stand above divine sovereignty, exactly the opposite of its founding tenets. The increasing
secularization of Iran, which ushered Khatami into the presidency, provides support for that
conclusion. Nevertheless, that does not necessarily speak to a weakening of Islam, but rather to
a decline of its influence in the political sphere.
The True Heirs to the Shah’s Army
The logical time bomb alone, however, cannot account for the Pasdaran’s ascension. It
had to contend with its peer security institutions including the MOIS and even the Artesh which
retained some residual influence, particularly as elements of Iran’s leadership became wary of
the Pasdaran.120 The conflict between the dual sovereignties only set the door ajar. What
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enabled it to be widened and then kept from being shut? Unfortunately for Khamenei, the
informal networks which worked so well to secure his position also gave the Pasdaran the
means to lock out its competitors and fend off attempts by other factions. Though Roy’s
classification is useful for examining the responses to the conceptual and political challenges in
the post-Khomeini era, a more conventional division (albeit with a bit more differentiation than
simply reformists and conservatives or leftists and rightists) is better suited for dealing with the
relationship between the Pasdaran and the institutions of the Islamic Republic. In the RAND
monograph, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of the Leadership Dynamics of Iran,
David Thaler et al. divide Iran’s ideological factions into four categories—the traditionalist
conservatives, reformists, pragmatic conservatives, and the principlists. 121
The axis of difference here runs along more practical policy matters rather than
theoretical conceptions of the state. Traditional conservatives are the largest faction, supporting
the continuance of the status quo, as their base of support lies with the lower-middle class, many
of the bazaari merchants, and the lower-ranking clerics who stand to lose power in any formal
rebalancing. Their antagonists, the reformers, began in the 1980s with moderate clerics arguing
for a more liberal order and the spawning of a civil society, peaking in influence with the
election of Khatami. The pragmatic conservatives may be thought of as reformist-lite. Centered
on Rafsanjani, they push for more economic openness and increasing ties with the United States,
while holding to traditionalist social mores. Finally, the principlists share much in common with
the traditional conservatives, but as with the reformists they decry the corruption of Iran’s
leadership, especially its clerics. Thus, they seek a return to the pure principles of the
Revolution. This is the faction dominated by the IRGC, which gained power in the Majlis and
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the presidency through Ahmadinejad on the support of the religiously devout and the poorest
classes.122 It must be pointed out as well that these factions cut across government institutions
and economic classes such that the Pasdaran itself is factionalized.123 Much of its troop strength
is filled by conscripts, going back even to the Iran-Iraq War. Thus, it is unsurprising to find
similar divisions within the Pasdaran itself. As was noted previously, the majority of its
members voted for Khatami in the 1997 presidential election.124
While the Pasdaran has its own trouble with factionalism that has not been an
insurmountable impediment. On the contrary, not only did it maintain enough coherence to
increase its power but it accomplished that by taking advantage of the informal networks both in
the economic and political/security spheres.125 What accounts for that coherency even as its
expanding financial assets and political clout gave its members the incentive to satisfy their own
self-interest, adding to the strain of divisions over differences in world view? The Pasdaran had
developed a corporate identity. Forged initially in the fires of the Iran-Iraq War, it grew stronger
with the Pasdaran’s increasing professionalism under Khamenei.126
States in the Middle East have long struggled with the dilemma of the professionalization
of their militaries. Each of them desires to enhance their security by modernizing the equipment
and procedures of their militaries, but as they grow more capable with the process of
professionalization so does the threat of a military coup. This results from the sense of corporate
identity that the officer corps acquires as well as their military training and discipline.127
Samuel Huntington defined professionalization as complete civilian control over the
military, a condition not yet achieved by the states of the region including Iran. So to counter the
risk of a military takeover, various control mechanisms, depending on the nature of the state and
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its history, operate to contain any such aspirations. These include the use of loyal tribal forces
and/or mercenaries, deliberately transforming ideological officers into civilian autocrats, and the
creation of an armed force of highly ideological nonprofessional irregulars. Iran opted for the
latter.128 Yet that solution is problematic itself because even apart from its influence outside the
military, the Pasdaran became the true heirs to the Shah’s army, in the words of Steven Ward’s
Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces.129
This development is in opposition to Huntington’s theory of military professionalization
leading to a less politicized armed force.130 In part this is due to the Pasdaran’s political origins
as an irregular force, and that their professionalization in terms of training was acquired on the
battlefield rather than formal instruction,131 but also to the access to informal networks. That
access empowered them relative to other military security organizations including the Artesh and
the MOIS through their connections with the alumni and their proximity to Khamenei.132
Ideally, a nonpolitical military provides advice on matters of security to civilian leaders who then
formulate the policies for the military to execute. Thus, the information input supposedly flows
through the proper channels producing the output.133
However, the assumption behind that process is that there is no asymmetry in knowledge
concerning matters of security and that the proper channels are not circumvented. Both are not
true in the case of Iran, resulting in a situation where the decision-making process warps back in
on itself such that the Pasdaran currently has a greater role in foreign policymaking than the
SNSC, whose influence is also dependent on the person who is appointed to be Khamenei’s
representative in the council. As Khamenei is the center of gravity of the decision-making
process, any government institution under his control cannot be managed by any government,
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implying that his subordinates willingly submit to his command. While it was assumed, until the
mid-2000s, that this was due to a lack of autonomy, after the election of Ahmadinejad, the
alumni have gradually taken over the security apparatus (as they did with the economy) which
was supposed to be an equal participant in the decision-making process.134 Further, the
Pasdaran was able to exploit their information advantage to increasingly exclude the MOIS from
being a competing source of expertise, leaving it as the only truly independent political actor
among its peer security institutions.135
Khamenei had an impossible challenge to overcome, in the form of a constitutional
contradiction. As he did not have the charisma of Khomeini, he could not embody the agah be
zaman,136 necessitating a great deal of reliance on patrimonialism, which he could not
completely execute because of his close relationship with the Pasdaran. Compounding this was
the unintentional replacement of one professional military, the Artesh, for another, the irregular
force designed to suppress it. 137 This error was compounded even further by the corporate
identity that enabled the Pasdaran to resist factionalism, such that those schisms acted as an
accelerant rather than a retardant. The unraveling of Khamenei’s patrimonial strategy may
explain his seemingly desperate move to explicitly offer Ahmadinejad support. That decision
may be seen as the final wobble of an unstable constitutional conception of rule of the clerics. In
any case it is not in keeping, historically, with most of the traditional practice of Shia Islam in
Iran, as evidenced by the rejection of the velayat-e faqih by most of the grand ayatollahs. With
the rise of secularization and increasing support even among the traditional clerics for the
development of a civil society, the ruling clerics’ only hope to maintain their relevance,
paradoxically, may be to relinquish the power of the state.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the Pasdaran has taken a remarkable path to power. From its lowly
origins as a loose collection of vigilante groups forged into an irregular armed force to protect
the Revolution particularly in its early stages to the preeminent security institution it has seen a
vast increase in its power.138 This study began with a look at the economic factors which
propelled that rise, as they encompass a number of turning points in the history of the Islamic
Republic and the Pasdaran. With the death of Khomeini, both Rafsanjani and Khamenei
showed favor to the Pasdaran’s leadership, though for different reasons. Moreover, the latter’s
objective introduced the basics of the tension between the theocratic and democratic elements of
the Islamic Republic, embodied foremostly in the Supreme Leader and the President, which
leads to the crux of how the door was cracked open for the Pasdaran in the first place.
Recapping the Economic Dimension of the Pasdaran
The initiative to encourage the Pasdaran to enter the economy expanded their political
role beyond their limited, internal security sphere, eventually enabling greater access to and
independence from the state apparatus.139 Giving the Pasdaran control over the reconstruction
of Iran’s infrastructure solved several problems at once, though it created new ones which were
not anticipated at the time. The Pasdaran was kept satisfied having its own source of funding
through the necessary rebuilding of Iran, while avoiding the unpleasant budget compromises of
funding two separate militaries in addition to rebuilding their war-torn infrastructure, which they
otherwise would have been forced to confront.140 Yet, the encouragement of corruption in
conjunction with the increasing urbanization that came with development provoked resentment
against the regime, resulting in the election of Khatami to the presidency in 1997.141 This was
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the turning point from which the clerics have never fully regained the power they had during the
Islamic Republic’s first decade.
Instead of listening to the cries of the public for a more liberal order, the clerics, fearing
for their rule and the ideals of the revolution, sought to resist those demands by closing ranks
with the Pasdaran. The consequences of that decision and the entry of the Pasdaran into the
economic sphere were compounded with the movement to denationalize the economy, whose
centrally planned nature was demanded by Article 44 of the constitution. In the wake of
Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 presidential elections, Khamenei issued a decree which
basically nullified Article 44. Rather than being a true privatization, however, the measure was
designed to transfer state assets from the more transparent government institutions to the more
opaque ones, primarily the bonyads, many of which the Pasdaran controlled, rather than private
firms. Thus, the Pasdaran was able to utilize its new assets to gain control of entire sectors of
Iran’s economy, accelerating the increase in their power after having first held, then beaten back
the reformists.142
None of this might have occurred, however, without the dilemma the Islamic Republic
faced upon the death of its founder, Khomeini. A successor had to be found with at least decent
religious credentials and an ability to manage the state, but this was complicated by the tension
between the positions of Supreme Leader and the Presidency which was magnified by the
mismatch in influence between Khamenei and Rafsanjani and their respective positions. While
Khamenei met the modified requirements to become Supreme Leader, his influence paled in
comparison to Rafsanjani’s, who succeeded the former as president.143 If Khamenei had had the
necessary clout to handle Rafsanjani on his own, he may not have empowered the Pasdaran to
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the same degree to compensate. Though, Rafsanjani still would have handed the management of
the bonyads to Pasdaran commanders, Khamenei would not have given such a blank check in
their contracting practices which were crucial to building up the wealth necessary for their future
political and economic advances. Moreover, neither would their room for maneuvering against
competing security institutions been as great without quite such proximity to Khamenei.
Recapping the Leadership Structure
Two important points then come from looking at economic factors. One, the Pasdaran’s
independent source of funding was the key material catalyst needed to increase their power and
just as consequential, the basis for Iran’s leadership structure has the potential for great
instability. That of course begs the question of from whence that instability arises. It is the
contention of this study that its source is the dual sovereignty of the Islamic Republic. The
necessity to modify the constitution in order for Khamenei to be qualified to become the new
Supreme Leader supports this view, as he had neither the religious credentials nor the popular
mandate possessed by Khomeini. Therefore, the leadership dynamic displays potential
instability in two different ways—the Supreme Leader has to embody both sovereignties and he
must be similar in ideology to and/or possess greater power than the president, the latter being
more important. For example, though President Bani-Sadr was not of one accord with Khomeini
he did not have the constitutional nor informal power to defy him, leaving the Supreme Leader
comfortably safe.144 Yet that was not the case with Khamenei and Rafsanjani.
As the highest ranking cleric Khomeini fit the concept of the velayat-e faqih like the
proverbial glove, but even his vast reservoir of charisma was insufficient to hold back the
demands of some of the faction’s desire for a republic.145 This had to be reconciled in the
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constitution with a completely theocratic state which was nonnegotiable for the Islamists. Of
course, it was an impossible task as the author of that resolution well knew given that the one
required submission to divine authority and the other to popular authority.146 Fortunately for the
fledgling revolutionary state Khomeini was able to embody both. While, Khamenei lacked that
capacity, as long as the ruling elite in the Majlis, Presidency, and the Supreme Leader were
united on the continuation of clerical rule, the political system was stable.147 That ceased to be
the case with Khatami’s electoral victory, leading to de facto dual governance, pitting the
reformers, who sought to implement a liberal, civil society using the government institutions
under their control, against the clerics led by Khamenei and aided by the Pasdaran. The latter
blocked the former at every turn using intimidation and informal channels to circumvent the
formal governing bodies.148
Yet the decision to ally themselves more closely with the Pasdaran did not have the
effect of stymieing the decline of clerics’ influence. It merely shifted it to the Pasdaran as was
evident after the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 and many veteran and active Pasdaran
members were elected to the Majlis in 2004. After weathering the reformist storm, the clerics
worked to restore stability through the use of a powerful governing body still under their
control—the Council of Guardians. That body has jurisdiction over which candidates meet the
requirements to run in elections for the presidency and the Majlis so they simply filtered out the
reformist candidates, clearing the way for candidates from the Pasdaran to assume positions of
power. The Pasdaran further consolidated their power at the cleric’s expense as Ahmadinejad
began to fill his cabinet with alumni. 149 It is an interesting question as to whether that influence
would have been better served if they had satisfied themselves with a limited defeat, siding with
45

an emerging civil society, but one in which they had still had a prominent place. The Pasdaran
at the time was not so powerful as to be able to overthrow them but now it grows ever stronger,
especially as Khamenei ages.
The clerics chose to cling to their power instead. On the contrary, their efforts resulted in
the waning of their power in tandem with the waxing of the Pasdaran’s. In their defense,
though, that outcome would not have been obvious to the casual observer, especially if they had
not factored in the development of the Pasdaran’s acute sense of itself as an institution apart
from the regime, to which it still remains loyal. This strong corporate identity was forged during
the Iran-Iraq War through the camaraderie and training acquired in battle. In contrast to their
design as an ideological irregular army, that experience also increased their professionalization,
quite unintentionally on the part of the clerics, which only served to strengthen their identity.
This worked to ameliorate their factional divisions as it grew more prominent.150 On the
contrary, factionalism in the state apparatus as a whole gave it the advantage against its peer
security institutions, particularly given its proximity to Khomeini and connections through the
alumni, even before the 2004 and 2005 elections.151
Recapping the Social and Religious Factors
In one of the ironic turn of affairs for Iran’s political leadership, the survival of the
Islamic Republic could only be purchased at the price of forsaking its most basic tenet—that
religion must take precedence over politics.152 Along that line of thought, it is difficult at first
glance to explain why Khomeini thought Khamenei was a good choice. In the opinion of the
author, there are really only two possible explanations for his decision, given the specific
constraints of the Islamic Republic, rather than those resulting from some general criteria for
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state leadership. The first is that Khomeini’s faith failed him at the crucial moment, and instead
of at least choosing an ayatollah let alone passing over the constitutionally demanded leading
marja, he placed politics before religion to secure the Islamic Revolution even being at least
somewhat aware of the complications that could arise for its leadership structure. Though such
reasoning may be unconventional, it is not unreasonable to hold Khomeini to the standards
which he himself set for political leadership in the Islamic Republic.
The second is much simpler—he had no choice. Why would he have no choice? This
led to the final and most fundamental question. From whence did the justification for clerical
rule come in the first place? The importance of this question is that it alludes to the origin of the
instability in the conception of clerical rule, which is what the Pasdaran, after all, was designed
to protect. As it was that instability that gave rise to the conditions that brought Khamenei to
power, the answer to that question then provides an explanation of how the Pasdaran began its
path to power.
Earlier in the conclusion the argument was recounted from chapter 3 that the schisms at
the Islamic Republic’s founding were the cause of the split institutionally in the Islamic
Republic. While this caused structural problems as its theocratic and democratic institutions are
incompatible, to which the creation of the Expediency Council attests, that says nothing of the
strength of the conceptual basis for clerical rule itself, as defined by Khomeini. Looking at the
historical roots for his interpretation of the infallibility of the Imams, led him to conclude that the
clerics should rule through the state, and that the leader of that state should be the leading marja
enabling him to fulfill the role of the velayat-e faqih.153 Yet the second criteria, that he must
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have the fealty of the people, being one who has the understanding of his time, was arguably
even more important.154
Therefore, the contradiction in Khomeini’s conception of rule by the Shia clerics is
similar to that between the constitutional institutions demanded by its dual sovereignties, which
forced him to choose Khamenei to succeed him over much more religiously qualified candidates,
even though the constitution demands that religion take precedence over political considerations.
Paradoxically, that choice, in the end, was forced upon him because of his belief system, even
though he would certainly have preferred a more qualified candidate. So in addition to the
irreconcilability of divine and popular sovereignty within the constitution, clerical rule is
irreconcilable unto itself, requiring the opposite of its basic tenet in order to function. That latter
contradiction left Khomeini no choice but to pick Khamenei. The former provided the catalyst
for the empowerment of the Pasdaran by putting into practice the division of the sovereignties
between the Supreme Leader and the President in Khamenei and Rafsanjani, respectively.
Alternative Explanations
A combination of factors that are external—and to a lesser extent—internal to the
Pasdaran have been put forth to explain its rise. Yet is that case really so unique? There are
several other instances of militaries expanding beyond their narrow sphere within authoritarian
states rather different from the Islamic Republic. In Rise of the Pasdaran: The Domestic Role of
the IRGC in Iran, Frederick Wehrey et al. assert that the expansion experienced by the Chinese
and Pakistani militaries are comparable to that of the Pasdaran. Though they do so in order to
gain insight into the latter’s future, one could also argue that if China’s developmental history is
similar, the factors fingered in this study were not consequential for the Pasdaran’s evolution.
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(The same cannot be said for Pakistan as it has experienced several periods of military rule
throughout its history, whereas the Islamic Republic has never been overtaken by a military
dictatorship). The counterargument is that it is possible that there are just many paths to military
expansion depending on the nature of its corresponding state, but that point is moot here as the
differences are relevant as will be shown.
Even as the People’s Liberation Army economic ventures grew out of the familiar
circumstance of the state seeking to supplement its military’s government funding155 there is a
key disparity between Iran and China which can be inferred from Wehrey et al.’s comparison. In
the case of China, it is telling that the military leadership was forced to hand over its business
operations by the civilian leadership whereas Wehrey et al. hypothesize that any such turn to
pragmatism and technocratism would come from within the IRGC itself.156 In addition, China’s
military leadership itself apparently had grown weary of handling their business operations,
agreeing with their civilian masters’ rationale for divesting them of their assets.157 This implies
greater factionalism within the Islamic Republic as opposed to the Chinese state, which would
work to inhibit the kind of control the latter’s leadership was able to impose upon its military.
Instead, this quality has allowed the IRGC to operate as a state within a state, maintaining and
expanding its influence.
Indeed, as was mentioned in the chapter on leadership, Khomeini actually set up his own
network to create a mini-state within a state to protect his new revolutionary regime against the
democratic elements of the Islamic Republic.158 This also points to the religious dimension of
Iran’s government that China’s does not possess. The IRGC was able to step into that pocket of
sovereignty created by that religious dimension when Khamenei took over that network and
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began creating one of his own.159 So while there are similarities, there are key differences
aligning with the arguments of this study which account for the lack of diminishment of the
Pasdaran’s influence.
Even more generally, some may argue that the case of the Pasdaran really needs no other
explanation than Graham Allison’s second model of group decision-making—the organizational
paradigm. He argued that expansion is endemic to all organizations as they seek to survive, in a
manner similar to a biological organism. They define their health in terms of their autonomy and
are thus compelled to increase the size of their bureaucratic turf, budget, and personnel.160
However, to the extent that dynamic was at work, the clerical regime would have kept it at bay if
the Supreme Leader desired it. This finds support in the first decade of the Pasdaran’s
existence, as Khomeini doggedly maintained its political neutrality, keeping it hemmed within
the security sphere.161 After Khomeini died, the political environment was certainly conducive
to the “colonizing activity” described by Allison,162 but that impetus alone cannot account for the
mechanics of why the next Supreme Leader, Khamenei, allowed them to do so when he had the
constitutional power to thwart them.
Subjects for Future Research
Though the author believes his argument better accounts for rise of the Pasdaran than the
alternatives presented above, there are nevertheless other lines of inquiry which could shed more
light on the evolution of the Pasdaran. Concerning its future, a more detailed understanding of
its inner workings is required to better discern whether it will remain cohesive enough to
continue gaining in power. If so, such an understanding would also yield insight into whether
the dominant group will choose to take over from the clerics and what relationship would be
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sought with them in the event of a takeover. Its past history also offers further avenues of
research, over the role of religion in its development.
Olivier Roy, for instance, recounted Professor Ervand Abrahamian’s contention that the
Iranian Revolution was really the last of the leftist, third world uprisings against imperialist
powers wrapped up in the cloak of Islam.163 Discovering to what extent Islam was the driving
force behind it would reveal the ceiling for the clerical regime’s support though not necessarily
its floor. Nonetheless, it might be possible to parse the legitimacy of the regime somewhat from
its nature, regardless of whether it had been more democratic or more theocratic. Extending that
line of reasoning, examining some counterfactuals concerning how the IRGC would have
developed under different leadership and constitutional structures (Table 2) offers a kind of test
for the fulcrum of this study’s argument that the Islamic Republic was constructed on unstable
foundations.
For example, how would the Pasdaran have developed under a purer Islamic theocracy
as opposed to the compromise that became the Islamic Republic? Would it have been able to
increase its influence and if so, could it have done so over the same time frame? Tentatively, the
answer to the first appears to be yes and no to the second. For the concept of the velayat-e faqih
has problems of its own, apart from any form of state to which it could be applied, but with no
formal constitutional power center to rival the Supreme Leader, it would likely have taken some
time for one to develop within the informal networks of Iran.
What of the velayat-e faqih itself? If Montazeri had succeeded Khomeini instead of
Khamenei would the IRGC have been kept in its proper place? That is trickier to answer,
especially when combined with the first counterfactual, as the former only tests the stability of
51

the velayat-e faqih while the latter tests both that of the velayat-e faqih and that of the
constitutional leadership structure at the same time. In any case, a thorough examination of all
three scenarios would demonstrate the relative importance of both instabilities to the rise of the
Pasdaran.
All Roads Lead to and from Khamenei
No matter the strength of the elements of each factor’s influence, the thread that ties all of
them together is the Supreme Leader, which for most of the Islamic Republic’s history has been
Khamenei. This is unsurprising as this study has argued that the other elements were either the
cause or the effect of his succession. Through him the Pasdaran’s development of the rural
areas led to an increase in urbanization and education which fueled the reformist movement,
whose origins lie in the decline in the legitimacy of clerical rule. That legitimacy was supported
by an unstable foundation in the velayat-e faqih, only finding a consistently functional
expression in Khomeini himself. Yet, even his charisma and stature were not enough to
overcome the factional disputes at the start of the Revolution, thus requiring a constitutional
structure which was itself a contradiction, only hastening the day of reckoning for clerical rule
upon Khomeini’s death. This is made fairly clear by their desperate collusion with the Pasdaran
to fend off the reformists which may well have been the decision that seals their fate.
As was stated above, it remains to be seen whether the Pasdaran will retain enough
cohesion to continue their ascension and thus its ability to take the reins of the state.
Nevertheless, in the short to medium term, its power will continue to increase as the clerics rely
upon it to an ever greater extent for the maintenance of their rule. If its trajectory holds through
Khamenei’s death it will be in a position to determine who the next Supreme Leader will be. On
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the other hand, it may decide to forgo the figurehead route completely and rule openly as a
military dictatorship. The path that prevails will depend on which faction wins out between the
old and new guards, as the former remain much more committed to the ideals of the Revolution,
decrying the corrupting influence of its commercial operations. As the former retire and are
replaced by the latter, the second option does not appear to be out of the question. Such an
outcome would be the greatest irony of all as Khomeini’s legacy will have crumbled at the hand
of the very organization meant to secure it.
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TABLES
Table 1: Elements of Three Factors Affecting Iran’s Political Economy
Government Policy
Reconstruction
contracts

Political Actor
Khamenei

Political Institution
Supreme Leader

Rafsanjani

Presidency

Khatami
Khomeini

Pasdaran
Supreme Leader

Khamenei

Presidency

Rafsanjani

Council of Guardians

Ahmadinejad
Khomeini

Supreme Leader

Succession of
Khamenei

Khamenei

Constitution

Development of Rural
Areas

Alumni

Pasdaran

Economic
Privatization
Altering the
Constitution
Leadership Banning Reformists
from elections

Professionalization of
the Pasdaran
Culture

Table 2: Counterfactual Scenarios
Supreme Leader

Islamic Republic

Islamic Theocracy

Khamenei

actual

IRGC rises more slowly

Montazeri

?

?
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